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Inaugural lecture 
 
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE DECOLONIZATION OF THE 
MIND 
 
Mijnheer de Rector, dames en heren: 
It is an honour to be appointed to a chair bearing the name of Desmond Tutu.  
Archbishop Tutu received his Nobel prize in 1984, but he is probably most famous for 
his later chairmanship of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  This 
body was established shortly after what was, by common consent, the most dangerous 
period in South Africa’s recent history.  I am referring to the four years between the 
unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and other anti-apartheid 
organizations in 1990 and South Africa’s first democratic election in 1994.  
Thousands of people lost their lives in that span of time as a result of violence that 
was more or less closely connected to the formal political process that led to a 
successful transfer of state power from the National Party to the ANC.   
I can recall a conversation I had with a leading Western ambassador in South Africa in 
1990.  Describing South Africa’s transition, the ambassador told me it was Africa’s 
last chance to join the real world.  Being an academic, and therefore pedantic, I cannot 
fully approve this formulation, since the world is what it is, and not what any one of 
us thinks it ought to be.  No country can ever join or leave the world, but can only 
conform to or differ from an ideological representation of it.  Still, I think I understand 
what the ambassador meant.  He was referring to a perception that the countries south 
of the Sahara, over the decades since most of them acquired sovereign status in the 
1950s and 1960s, have generally failed to find political stability or to fulfil their 
economic potential.  They have become a permanent concern of the international 
community, which, collectively and via bilateral relations, provides them with 
development aid.  South Africa, the ambassador was implying, has the means to lead 
the rest of sub-Saharan Africa out of the hole into which it has fallen.   
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We are now nineteen years further on from that conversation, and fifteen years from 
the inauguration of the first ANC government in South Africa.  No serious observer 
has any doubt that the country has seen specific improvements since 1994, too 
numerous for me to list here.   Yet South Africa has not lived up to all the hopes raised 
when it endowed itself for the first time with a government elected by the whole adult 
population.  The country’s high levels of poverty and its growing inequality have been 
a matter of comment for some years.  Moreover, it remains a violent society.  Last 
year, anti-foreigner attacks did considerable damage to South Africa’s image 
worldwide.  In fact, one-third of the 62 people killed as a result of these violent 
assaults1  were not foreigners at all, but South Africans generally from rural areas, in 
many cases killed because they were not perceived as having full rights of residence 
in urban settlements where competition for houses and space is intense.  That brutal 
outburst confirmed what has been evident for some time, namely that South Africa is 
not the rainbow nation that Desmond Tutu prayed for.  In effect, many South Africans 
do not perceive citizenship as homogeneous, but as a series of layers, like the skins of 
an onion.2  Some citizens are believed to be at the inner core, with real rights, while 
others are deemed to have lesser rights, because of their geographical or ethnic origin.  
Poor immigrants from the rest of Africa have the fewest rights of all. 
Conflicts fuelled by differing perceptions of citizenship are only one issue requiring 
reconciliation, the process of persuading the people who live in South Africa to exist 
in peace, accepting the realities of their past and the responsibilities that flow from 
such acceptance.  Here we encounter another aspect of the vision dear to Desmond 
Tutu: the idea that South Africa’s long season of violence would pass with the 
election of a democratic government and the promulgation of a non-racial 
constitution.  This, too, is open to question.  The hope that a formal political 
agreement between all the main political parties would end South Africa’s violence 
was often based on a misidentification of the nature of that violence.  In the last years 
of apartheid, strategic thinkers from both the state security forces and the anti-
apartheid camp broadly agreed that their country was at war.  From the mid-1970s,  
the South African Defence Force was conducting a conventional military campaign in 
                                                 
1 BBC News, ‘South Africa appeal on xenophobia’, 11 May 2009: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8044186.stm [accessed 11 May 2009]. 
2 Shireen Hassim, Tawana Kupe and Eric Worby (eds), Go Home or Die Here: Violence, xenophobia 
and the reinvention of difference in South Africa (Wits University Press, Johannesburg, 2008), p.16. 
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Angola and launched commando raids on some other countries. Within South Africa 
itself, the war was never of a conventional type.  Much of the violence that occurred 
there was socially rooted, shaped by the country’s history of conquest and 
segregation.  Both the ANC and other insurrectionary organizations and the state’s 
counter-insurgency forces aimed to use this socially-grounded violence for their own 
purposes.  As a leading military strategist wrote in a manual adopted by the state 
security forces at the height of repression in the 1980s, ‘the objective for both sides in 
a revolutionary war is the population itself’.3  Accordingly, it was the population at 
large that bore the brunt of the violence.  
South Africa’s transformation  
Appreciating the degree to which the war for South Africa was rooted in society 
throws some light on subsequent violence.  According to the most recent available 
statistics, 18,487 murders were reported to the South African Police Service4 in the 
twelve months to March 2008, not to mention other types of serious violence.  The 
number of murders before 1994 was often lower than this.5  In other words, more 
people may be being murdered in South Africa at a time of peace than when the 
struggle for liberation was at its height.   
South Africa is no longer involved in a conventional war or even a guerrilla war, but 
it is, as one recent author put it, a country at war with itself.6  This expression reflects 
a paradox that was already apparent to observers of Archbishop Tutu’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission as it struggled to disentangle political from non-political 
motivations in the violence perpetrated by individuals.  The apartheid years had 
thrown up such grotesque cases as that of Barend Strydom, the self-proclaimed wit 
wolf,7 a white supremacist who shot seven black people dead in a random attack in 
1988. These murders were carried out as expressions of a racist ideology that had 
                                                 
3 Brigadier C.A. Fraser, ‘Lessons learnt from past revolutionary wars’, p.5, unpublished text circulated 
among senior officers of the South African Defence Force.  Copy in the author’s possession. 
4 Official South African police statistics reported at 
http://www.saps.gov.za/statistics/reports/crimestats/2008/crime_stats_2008.htm [accessed 26 March 
2009]. 
5 The pre-1994 statistics are notoriously unreliable.  Mark Shaw, Crime and Policing in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa: Transforming under fire (C. Hurst & Co., London, 2002), pp.15-17. 
6 Antony Altbeker, A Country at War with Itself: South Africa’s crisis of crime (Jonathan Ball 
Publishers, Johannesburg and Cape Town, 2007). 
7 His own memoir is Barend Strydom Die Wit Wolf: ‘n belydenis (Vaandel Uitgevers, Mosselbaai, 
1997). 
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been personally embraced, and not at the behest of any organization.  Nevertheless, 
Strydom was eventually released from prison. Four young Africanist militants who, 
five years later, killed an American anti-apartheid activist, Amy Biehl, in the mistaken 
belief that she was a white South African, were granted amnesty by the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission on the grounds that they had been incited by militant 
political speeches.8  These are extreme cases, but it was in mobilizing emotions and 
inciting people to violence that both the struggle to overthrow apartheid and the 
counter-insurgency campaign deployed by the apartheid state took shape.  Political 
and military strategists aimed to subsume conflicts that were socially generated into 
grand narratives of the state and the nation.  Actions that in other circumstances might 
have been interpreted as non-political thereby became politicized.  A murder or a car-
hijacking could become a political act.  The installation of a democratic government 
in 1994 removed the legitimacy previously accorded to many acts in contravention of 
the law that had earlier been hailed as political, but without redressing the social 
processes from which they had sprung. 
To place the relation between politics and crime in proper context it should be 
appreciated that the system of government that existed in South Africa before 1994 
was based not only on the control of the state apparatus by a particular political party, 
but on a social order in which each person was designated by law as belonging to an 
ethnically defined population group.  Each group was deemed to have its proper 
place.  Various types of social or even personal relationship thereby acquired a 
political complexion.  One of the great achievements of opposition political activists 
in the 1980s was to persuade a broad swath of the South African public, not to 
mention world opinion, that the system of apartheid underlay all social tensions.  It 
might have been more accurate to express matters another way, however, by noting 
that social tensions arising from a difficult past underlay successive forms of 
oppression, of which apartheid was the most recent and most pervasive.  In various 
parts of South Africa, Dutch and British colonial regimes and a self-governing 
dominion had already enacted laws that effectively took land away from the country’s 
earlier inhabitants.  The formation of labour markets and hierarchies of authority 
generated further conflicts.  South Africa had already been a self-governing country, 
                                                 
8 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (5 vols., Cape Town, 1998), 3, p.511. 
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under white minority rule, for over three decades before the National Party came to 
power in 1948 and proceeded to implement the policy it called apartheid. 
The long negotiations leading to South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994 
changed the relationship between the social and political spheres.  Yet, the formal 
change of political authority that abolished apartheid did not itself bring about the 
deeper transformation of society to which many South Africans aspire.  Eighteen 
thousand, four hundred and eighty-seven lives lost in just one year9 are an indication 
that violent struggles continue, now in a form divorced from any conventional 
definition of politics.  Some murders are so banal, such as when people are killed for 
their mobile phones, that they cannot be dignified with the description of a political 
act.  The fact that they are accompanied by other forms of violence, domestic and 
sexual, strengthens the impression that violence constitutes a complex social fact that 
cannot convincingly be viewed as a crude form of class struggle.10  In this sense, 
South Africa’s political transformation—here meaning the transfer of political control 
over the state—is one component of a more diffuse set of struggles, social in nature.   
This situation is not, in principle, unusual.  All societies have their share of conflict, 
major and minor.  Appeals for the state to implement a complete social transformation 
must therefore be regarded with some scepticism, as such a project can never lead to a 
final stage of total harmony, but only to new forms of struggle.  As Archbishop Tutu 
recognized long ago, what is most important for South Africa is to achieve a degree of 
equilibrium through mutual acceptance by people who are destined to live with each 
other.  But as Archbishop Tutu has also pointed out, reconciliation means more than 
saying sorry for past wrongs.  It implies restitution.  The ideological and even spiritual 
aspects of reconciliation cannot be divorced from its material aspects.  The fact that 
white South Africans continue on average to enjoy a higher standard of living than 
their black compatriots therefore constitutes a continuing reminder of the legacies of 
past injustices and of the limits of reconciliation. 
The notion that South Africa’s transformation remains incomplete is held by people at 
different points of the ideological spectrum.  For the South African Communist Party, 
now more influential than at any time since 1990, the country’s first democratic 
                                                 
9 See note 4. 
10 Altbeker, A Country at War. 
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election was the expression of a national revolution that still has to be superseded by a 
second phase that communists believe to be inevitable, namely a socialist revolution.  
Many white South Africans and quite a few of the ‘coloured’ population, meanwhile, 
perceive that policies of black empowerment are depriving them of the equal political 
rights that are guaranteed by the constitution.  From both these points of view, the 
political transformation that occurred in 1994 has not been pursued to its logical 
conclusion.  This is hardly surprising inasmuch as the settlement of 1994 and the 
constitution entrenching it were based on a compromise, and compromises require 
people to renounce pursuit of their interests or convictions to the bitter end.   
The African context 
 
Let me now return to the ambassador who told me in 1990 that the South African 
transition was Africa’s last chance to join the real world.  He was alluding to a longer 
phase of African history, from the late 1940s onwards, encompassing the period of 
decolonization and subsequent attempts to mould disparate political communities into 
nations while building efficient public bureaucracies that could play a role in the mass 
reshaping of society.  
  
South Africa does not fit easily into a pan-African chronology that is determined by 
reference to the period of formal colonial rule.  The colonization of South Africa 
began rather early, when the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) established a 
supply station in Table Bay in 1652, that grew into today’s Cape Town. Legally 
speaking, South Africa ceased to be a colony in 1910. Still, it is not hard to understand 
why the South African Communist Party and the ANC invented the expression  
Colonialism of a Special Type to designate the South African condition under 
apartheid, referring to a situation in which a sovereign state was ruled by a local 
political party, but one that represented a particular section of the country’s population 
only, defined by skin colour.   
 
If we are better to understand some common elements that link South Africa to the 
rest of the African continent, it is useful to approach the issue not in constitutional 
terms, noting when a certain territory became a European colony and when it acquired 
international recognition of its sovereignty,  but in terms of a longer history of the 
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insertion of the whole continent of Africa into global relations of diplomacy, trade and 
production.  An early form of globalization came into existence in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries when European traders used South American silver to finance 
their expeditions to Asia, transporting slaves from Africa to America to work in their 
mines and plantations.  This was the context in which the original VOC station at 
Cape Town was established.   
 
As Europeans came to exert control over increasingly large parts of the globe, they 
developed a particular view of their own place in history.  Many Europeans, and 
Americans too, came to believe themselves to be the possessors of the most advanced 
institutions and systems of government the world has ever seen. They have often 
thought these systems so good that they should in principle be applied everywhere.  
Reasoning along lines dictated by a particular concept of progress, it was common 
until quite recently, and among the European and American general publics perhaps 
even now, to suppose that Africans are living not just in another continent, but in 
another phase of historical time, one that Europe and America have long outgrown.   
It was at the peak of the Atlantic slave trade, in the late eighteenth century, that the 
anti-slave trade movement was established in Great Britain.  In one of the first 
campaigns to mobilize public opinion in something like our modern sense, the anti-
slave trade activists, many of them with roots in the evangelical revival of their age, 
persuaded the British parliament to abolish the slave trade in 1807.11  Anti-slave trade 
and anti-slavery movements arose in other European countries also.   
The association of Africa with the Atlantic slave trade and the abolition thereof 
marked the emergence among a significant number of people in northern Europe 
especially of a conviction that they had a moral duty to lift Africa, the victim of the 
slave trade, to a higher condition.  At that time, this was generally expressed as a 
mission to bring ‘civilization’ to Africa.12 This term was used by nineteenth-century 
Europeans to designate a transfer of European technical expertise and, usually, 
Christian religion.  Together, it was believed, these could transform whole 
populations and bring them into the world of capitalist trade and, eventually, within 
                                                 
11 Among a spate of recent work occasioned by the bicentenary of abolition, see e.g.  Adam 
Hochschild, Burying the Chains: The British struggle to abolish slavery (Macmillan, London, 2005). 
12 E.g. William Ellis, History of Madagascar, 2 vols. (Fisher, Son, & Co., London and Paris), I, p.82.   
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the international concert of states.  Missionary societies were founded in many 
European countries with a view to converting Africans and bringing them into a more 
advanced phase of history. Africa has occupied a particular role in the Western moral 
imagination ever since.  Britain’s prime minister Tony Blair, for example, famously 
referred to Africa as ‘a scar on the conscience of the world’.13 
It was after 1945 that this longstanding moral commitment to Africa acquired the 
form of a technocratic concept of ‘development’ that is familiar to us today.  The 
United States’ president Harry Truman, articulating a strategy of global economic 
expansion that was intended both to outflank Communism and to avoid a post-war 
economic depression, declared in his inaugural address on 20 January 1949: ‘we must 
embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and 
industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped 
areas’.14  Twinned with an ideology of political emancipation, this policy of global 
development was profoundly unsettling to European colonial empires.  The Soviet 
Union enthusiastically endorsed the same principle of global political and economic 
upliftment as long as its own official myth—to the effect that it was a union of 
emancipated peoples rather than a Russian empire—was not questioned.  In time, the 
Soviet government came to consider hegemony over the third world as the key to a 
global victory in the cold war.15    
 
In brief, this was the international environment in which African development in its 
contemporary sense was born and in which colonial territories in Africa acquired 
sovereign status.  In most African countries, development came to mean legislating 
sovereign states into existence and equipping them with the bureaucratic apparatus 
regarded by the international community as standard and with a supply of capital 
necessary to raise growth rates and to pay for essential nation-building projects.  In 
South Africa, it was clear that this process posed an implicit threat to white rule, and 
from the 1950s onwards, South Africa’s apartheid government generally tried to 
convey the impression that the country was part of Africa in a geographical sense 
                                                 
13 Tom Porteous, Britain in Africa (Zed Books and University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, London, New 
York and Pietermaritzburg, 2008),  p.42. 
14 The text of the speech is available at http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres53.html [accessed 23 
February 2008]. 
15 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrohkin, The Mitrohkin Archive II: The KGB and the world (Allen 
Lane, London, 2005), ch.23, esp. pp.480-1. 
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only.  In most other respects, the National Party government portrayed itself as a 
distant outpost of the North Atlantic world and therefore a natural ally of the West in 
the cold war.  Any suggestion that South Africa could be lumped with the rest of 
Africa, such as was made by British prime minister Harold Macmillan in his famous 
speech to the all-white parliament in Cape Town in 1960, warning that a ‘wind of 
change’ was blowing through the continent,16 was not welcomed by supporters of 
apartheid.   One strand of the South African government’s reaction to the new 
discourse of African freedom and development was to articulate the policy known as 
‘separate development’ in regard to those of its own rural areas that it deemed to be 
Bantu homelands, mimicking within its own sphere the policy of world powers in 
regard to Africa as a whole.   
 
In political language, the historical rearrangement of Africa’s political structures and 
legal status after 1945 is often subsumed under the terms ‘decolonization’ and 
‘liberation’.  It is a process that is generally considered to have come to a formal 
conclusion, or at least the end of a major phase, with South Africa’s first democratic 
elections in 1994.  All over Africa, the development that was explicitly bound to 
projects of national liberation meant obliging communities that were overwhelmingly 
agrarian to make more systematic use of money and exhorting them to become more 
productive.  Systematic attempts were also made to encourage individualism and 
literacy, using techniques of social engineering17 based on prevailing theories in 
sociology, political science and development economics.   These measures were 
applied in a continent that had in most places been quite thinly populated throughout 
its history, and only modestly productive in economic terms.  Most African societies 
had been governed throughout their existence without reference to political entities 
that we would today recognize as states, and indeed without the use of writing.  In 
fact, according to the historian John Lonsdale, ‘[t]he most distinctively African 
contribution to human history could be said to have been precisely the civilized art of 
living fairly peaceably together not in states’.18   
                                                 
16 Frank Myers, ‘Harold Macmillan’s “winds of change” speech: a case study in the rhetoric of policy 
change’, Rhetoric and Public Affairs, 3, 4 (2000), pp.555-75.  Although the speech has gone down in 
history as the ‘winds of change’, Macmillan in fact referred only to ‘wind’ in the singular. 
17 A phrase apparently invented by Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (1957; Routledge, London 
and New York, 2002), pp.38-9. 
18 John Lonsdale, 'States and social processes in Africa: a historiographical survey', African Studies 
Review, 24, 2-3 (1981), p.139. 
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Africa’s experience of development bears comparison with the histories of many other 
parts of the world in the twentieth century.  What they have in common are attempts 
to improve society by the bureaucratic application of policies based on ideologies, 
theories and techniques conceived in the mode of social science.  The American 
political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski, who has also served as his country’s national 
security advisor, uses the term ‘coercive utopias’ to designate these schemes based on 
purportedly scientific principles to improve the human condition.  The twentieth 
century witnessed an unprecedented toll of lives ‘deliberately extinguished through 
politically motivated carnage’, as he puts it,19 connected to attempts to create coercive 
utopias.  The sociologist Manuel Castells makes a similar point when he warns us that 
‘to put it bluntly, all Utopias lead to Terror if there is a serious attempt at 
implementing them’.20  The great irony is that these same coercive utopias have 
resulted in a huge increase in the number of human beings on the planet, and in the 
ability of a significant minority among them to enjoy unprecedented wealth and 
comfort.  
In short, the development attempted in Africa from the mid-twentieth century 
onwards may be described as a coercive utopia.  Development in Africa has 
brought such benefits as increasing the numbers of children in school.  By 
improving health care, development policies have been closely associated with 
the massive increase in population that Africa has witnessed over the last six or 
seven decades ‘of a scale and speed unique in human history’, in the opinion of 
one leading historian.21  On the other hand, the failure to achieve some of the 
goals of the hugely ambitious policies of social engineering implemented in 
Africa in the name of liberation and development since 1945 has led to the 
implosion of some states amid widespread social upheaval.  (It should be said in 
passing that this is not true of the whole of Africa, and nor is it true of Africa 
alone, as the same has occurred in some other parts of the world).   
Coming to terms with history 
                                                 
19 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control: Global turmoil on the eve of the twenty-first century (Charles 
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1993), p.17.  
20 Manuel Castells, End of Millennium (1998; Second edn., Blackwell, Malden MA etc., 2000), p.63. 
21 John Iliffe, Africans: The history of a continent (2nd edn., Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.2. 
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For African nationalists, South Africa’s democratic election of 1994 was a milestone 
in the liberation of their continent.  The way was now clear for Africa to rediscover its 
true identity.  Peace, they believed, could come to societies that had been 
fundamentally destabilized by the colonial experience or its cousin, apartheid. Thabo 
Mbeki, already in effect South Africa’s premier and shortly to become its president, 
began to speak of an African renaissance.  He was expressing the idea that a continent 
that had once been colonized and humiliated was now ready to face the problems of 
its time by drawing on its own traditions, in full self-confidence, no longer 
overshadowed by foreigners.  The South African poet Breyten Breytenbach, no 
admirer of the current ANC government, expresses this aspiration as ‘an African 
modernity nourished from African roots and realities’.22   
 
But the late 1990s did not witness an African renaissance in this sense.  One of the 
great hopes of the African renaissance was that the fall in 1997 of the notorious 
dictator Mobutu Sese Seko in what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo would 
liberate the continent’s heartland.  In fact, Mobutu’s enforced departure turned into a 
period of war and misery in central Africa that has cost more lives than any 
international conflict since the Second World War.  Not even South Africa has found 
true peace and reconciliation, but has become a society at war with itself, as we have 
mentioned.    
If we are to wonder whether and how Africans, including those in its southernmost 
country, can regain the self-confidence necessary to face the future in the spirit of 
realism suggested by Breytenbach and others, we need to reconsider the role of the 
colonial period in Africa’s longer history, as I have suggested.  It is also necessary to 
situate the matter in a broader geographical context.  This can usefully be done by 
referring to Asia.  Perhaps the most common assertion made by commentators on 
world affairs today is that China has truly become a great power, with India close 
behind.   It is also sometimes pointed out that this is not such a remarkable occurrence 
as may at first appear, as China and India are merely reoccupying something like the 
position they had relative to Europe before the nineteenth century, in terms of 
                                                 
22 Breyten Breytenbach, ‘Mandela’s smile: notes on South Africa’s failed revolution’,  Harpers 
Magazine (December 2008):  http://www.thetruthseeker.co.uk/article.asp?ID=9848 [accessed 28 May 
2009]. 
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economic performance, population size and other forms of measurement.23  Not least, 
the rise of some Asian countries as major economic powers signifies the degree to 
which their intellectual, scientific and bureaucratic elites have mastered a corpus of 
technical knowledge that emerged to a large extent in the West.  Yet Asian elites have 
generally continued to find a notable degree of inspiration in their own histories and 
philosophies.  The historian Dipesh Chakrabarty is one of many scholars to have 
argued that the West has too often believed that, during the period of its own 
extraordinary hegemony, Europeans were the only historical actors whose ideas and 
actions mattered in the sense of having lasting influence on the world.  Chakrabarty’s 
argument is not a nihilist statement to the effect that we should pay no heed to the 
writings of dead white men, as the cliché goes.  Nor is it a crude assertion that Asia 
must remain true to something called Asian values (another cliché). On the contrary, 
he argues that the ideas of the great European thinkers have become the property of 
all mankind.24   
The proposition that key Asian countries have been able to pick up a historical thread 
by assuming responsibility for their past, including its colonial phase, may be 
extended to the world more generally.  We have noted that colonial territories all over 
the world became sovereign states after 1945.  This resulted in an increase in 
membership of the United Nations from 51 states at its inception to 192 today.  In 
regard to Africa specifically, commentators and analysts advance various reasons why 
so many of these new states have failed to fulfil their potential, varying from neo-
colonialism and the ruthless self-interest of great powers to home-grown errors and 
flaws and combinations of all of these.   
 
In retrospect, we can see that when African countries acquired sovereignty, the new 
regimes, although now presided over by Africans rather than Europeans, continued to 
make abundant use of the practices, routines and mentalities of their colonial 
predecessors.  These postcolonial states became a platform for a more ambitious form 
of political monopoly than anything European colonial officials had attempted.  But 
                                                 
23 Cf. Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the making of the modern world 
Economy (Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2000). 
24Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial thought and historical difference 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2000), p.5. 
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this state of affairs proved to be of short duration.25  Various crises of the 1970s and 
1980s produced pressures, external and internal, for the economic and political 
reconfiguration of Africa’s postcolonial states.  Deprived of the superpower support 
they had enjoyed during the cold war, by the 1990s some of them had lost their state-
like quality to the extent that talk emerged of ‘collapsed’ states26 or ‘failed’ states, a 
phrase popularized by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright,27 and today more 
generally known as ‘fragile’ states.  All of these terms designate a renewal of informal 
politics as local societies adapt to the diminished presence of the bureaucratic state 
together with the services it can provide.  The perceived fragility of many African 
states today is characteristic of a new historical phase superseding the two decades 
that might usefully be labelled as ‘postcolonial’.  
In some respects, then, Africa has been thoroughly decolonized.  Formal sovereignty 
has been enhanced by a partial acquisition of financial power.  Yet the most important 
sort of decolonization remains still to take place.  This is the decolonization of the 
mind.  Although this phrase is not mentioned by Chakrabarty, it could be used to 
describe the argument used by him and some other scholars.28  The key to 
decolonizing the mind, I suggest, is for all concerned not to reject their past but to 
assume responsibility for it.  It should be recognized that Africans were not entirely 
passive throughout the processes of colonization and deepening dependency, and that 
these were phases in a much longer history of insertion in global affairs that began 
long before colonial times.  Furthermore, there is not, and never has been, an 
authentic Africa that is unchanged by time, outside history, waiting to reawake from 
long sleep.  This is actually a myth of European Romanticism that has been taken over 
by African nationalists. Encouraging the belief in an authentic Africa that is a 
permanent victim of history makes it very hard to think of twenty-first century Africa 
other than as a place that is failing to develop, unless it is by arguing that the continent 
                                                 
25 Crawford Young, ‘The end of the post-colonial state in Africa? Reflections on changing African 
political dynamics’, African Affairs, 103, 410 (2004), pp.23-49. 
26 I. William Zartman (ed), Collapsed States: The disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority 
(Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 1995). 
27 She used this phrase at her first press conference after her appointment, on 24 January 1997: 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/january97/albright_1-24.html [accessed 27 December 
2008]. 
28 Cf. Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Decolonising the Mind: The politics of language in African literature (James 
Currey, London, 1986).  It is striking how often key insights into Africa’s societies and politics have 
come from novelists sometimes decades before they have been identified by social scientists. 
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is poised to achieve a stunning breakthrough, as development experts often do in an 
effort to show that it is not their policy, but reality itself, that is defective.   
By the same token, we Europeans must do something similar for ourselves. We too 
still live with a myth that was generated by the experience of world domination, 
namely that every society must sooner or later follow the Western path of 
development if it is truly to reach the modern age. The rise of Asia, including by its 
acceptance of intellectual cosmopolitanism, implies that ideas of Asian and African 
provenance not only have their own validity, but also have the potential to become 
relevant to Europe. 
I may go to the heart of the matter by quoting Martin Luther King, an honorary doctor 
of this university, who referred in a speech on 4 April 1967, exactly one year before 
his death, to ‘the Western arrogance of feeling that it has everything to teach others 
and nothing to learn from them’.29  For two centuries or more, European thinkers have 
developed a view of the world that purports to be universal but that is in fact based on 
an idealized reading mostly of their own history.  I suggest that it is precisely this 
arrogance of feeling that we will have to renounce as a consequence of the resurgence 
of Asian powers in particular, and that if we do this, we will come to see Africa too in 
a new light. 
If we Europeans are to understand the world now emerging, it is in our own interest  
to accept that not all of the ideas that we have distilled from a reading of our own 
history are signboards to be passed by all mankind on its journey into the future.  We 
will have to judge the histories of countries outside Europe partly by criteria derived 
from their own readings of their past.  Further, we may even have to review aspects of 
our own history in that light.  We will then be able to interpret Africa’s current 
problems in terms other than as a botched decolonization or a liberation that is always 
incomplete.  In the case of South Africa, we will be able to conceive of its current 
state and future prospects in ways that are not determined by a failure to be like us.  
Exactly what these new ways will be no one presently knows.  They will emerge from 
how South Africans interpret their own history. 
                                                 
29 Martin Luther King, ‘Beyond Vietnam: a time to break silence’, published at http://www.hartford-
hwp.com/archives/45a/058.html [accessed 18 June 2009]. 
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This is not a call for us to abandon our most cherished ideals in a spirit of despair, for 
example in regard to human rights and basic liberties, but rather to reinvigorate them 
by paying far more attention to data drawn from outside Europe than we have done, 
and by respecting the authority of thinkers formed in other traditions. Increasingly, we 
will have to appreciate the ways in which others see the world, not only for purposes 
of comparison and insight, but simply to understand how the world has become what 
it is.  We should cease believing almost instinctively that ideas emanating from Africa 
must be wrong, since our underlying assumption is that they are destined to be 
replaced with ideas made in Europe.  This will break the habit of decades, even 
centuries.   
We Europeans, too, have to decolonize our minds.   
Mijnheer de Rector, ladies and gentlemen, this seems an appropriate point at which to 
close.  But before doing so, I must recognize and thank at least some of those who 
have made this occasion possible, including Archbishop Tutu himself and the College 
van Bestuur of this university.  I would also like to thank the Faculty of Social 
Sciences and especially the dean of the faculty, Professor Bert Klandermans, who has 
made me feel so welcome in my new job.  So too have my colleagues in the Culture, 
Organization and Management group headed by Professor Marcel Veenswijk.  
However my most immediate colleagues, and those with whom I am in the closest 
contact since we all share the same office, are the staff of the Southern Africa-VU-
Strategic Alliances office, SAVUSA, headed by Dr Harry Wels.  Included in this 
category of closest colleagues are my fellow Tutu professors Eddy Van der Borght, 
Chris Elbers and Geert Savelsbergh.  I would also like to thank Professor Leo de 
Haan, director of the Afrika-Studiecentrum in Leiden, for allowing me to share my 
time between that institution and this one.  Last but not least, I would like to thank my 
life partner, Gerrie ter Haar, herself a professor, from whom I have learned so much. 
 
Thank you all. 
 
 
